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INTRODUCTION
A. Background to Islamic Project Finance
Project finance exemplifies modem globalized business transactions
in that a single project can bring together numerous participants from
across the world, and in that sense it is a truly international undertaking.'
A general definition of project finance is "the financing of an economic
unit in which the lenders look initially to the cash flows from operation
of that economic unit for repayment of the project loan and to those cash
flows and other assets comprising the economic unit as collateral for the
loan."' The "economic unit" is often referred to as a Special Project Ve-
hicle (SPV). Project finance is commonly used to finance large-scale
infrastructure projects such as toll roads, power plants, airports, and de-
salination plants, as well as natural resource exploitation projects such as
hydroelectric dams, mining projects, oil and gas assets, and paper mills.4
These types of projects often require larger amounts of capital than one
company alone can raise, or entail greater amounts of risk than one
company alone can bear.' Thus, project finance enables companies to
pool capital and spread risk.6 Moreover, because the project is its own
economic unit, it is "off-balance sheet"'7 from the vantage point of the
sponsor companies, thus further insulating the sponsors from the pro-
ject's liabilities. Also, governments will sometimes look to project
finance to undertake projects that would be difficult for the government
to finance through its own resources, or because the host country and its
government lack the expertise to domestically construct and operate the
1. See generally JOHN M. NIEHUSS, INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE IN A NUT-
SHELL (2010) (explaining that international project finance contains a cross-border dimension
where participants from many different countries can take part in a transaction).
2. Michael J.T. McMillen, Islamic Shari'ah-Compliant Project Finance: Collateral
Security and Finance Structure Case Studies, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1184, 1186 (2001).
3. See NIEHUSS, supra note 1, at 4.
4. See McMillen, supra note 2, at 1186.
5. See E.R. YESCOMBE, PRINCIPLES OF PROJECT FINANCE § 2.5.1, at 16 (2002); see
also McMillen, supra note 2, at 1187 (noting the aversion of project sponsors to guaranteeing
project loans or incurring balance sheet liability from a project).
6. See YESCOMBE, supra note 5, § 2.5.1, at 15-16; see also McMillen, supra note 2, at
1185-87 (describing briefly how project finance operates).
7. "Off-balance sheet" means the Special Project Vehicle's (SPV) debt does not appear
on the sponsoring companies' balance sheets. This avoids any formal restrictions on additional
borrowing that may be part of the sponsoring companies' existing debt obligations. See NIE-
Huss, supra note 1, at 21. Off-balance sheet financing also insulates the assets of the
sponsoring companies in the event the project defaults. See id. at 4-5.
8. See YESCOMBE, supra note 5, § 2.5.1, at 16; see also McMillen, supra note 2, at
1187.
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project.9 In sum, project finance is common in both the public and pri-
vate sector, and has been since the mid 1970s.'o
Indeed, there are very few countries and economic systems in the
world where project finance techniques have not been used to undertake
the construction and operation of a project." Countries in which Islam is
the predominant religion (the Islamic world)" and financiers from such
countries have perhaps been the most recent entrants to the world of pro-
ject finance. As such, project financing in and from the Islamic world
picked up steam only in the last ten years." This late arrival is due in
large part to conflicts between many fundamental principles of Western
project financing and certain Islamic principles.14 Despite these obsta-
cles, growth in project finance in the Islamic world is due in large part to
surges in the price of oil and the resulting pools of excess cash that
governments in the Islamic world have accumulated and invested in in-
frastructure.'5
9. See YESCOMBE, supra note 5, § 2.5.2, at 17-19.
10. See BENJAMIN C. ESTY, MODERN PROJECT FINANCE: A CASEBOOK 26-29 (2004);
see also M. FOUZUL KABIR KHAN & ROBERT J. PARRA, FINANCING LARGE PROJECTS: USING
PROJECT FINANCE TECHNIQUES AND PRACTICES 38-91 (2003) (discussing the history of pro-
ject finance from the time of the Code of Hammurabi to modem times).
I1. One curious case is China. Project finance has not been used as extensively in Chi-
na as the size of its economy would indicate. See YESCOMBE, supra note 5, § 3.1.1, at 23
(noting that project finance lending in China has tapered off since 1998).
12. In terms of geography, the Islamic world could be said to constitute a belt around
the globe from Morocco and Cote d'Ivoire in West Africa to Indonesia and Malaysia in South-
east Asia, with most of the countries in between possessing predominantly Muslim
populations, such as Saudi Arabia and Somalia, or a large minority population of Muslims,
such as in India and China. See Fuaad A. Qureshi & Mathew M. Millet, Introduction to Is-
lamic Finance, at 1, 8 (Harvard Business School, Ser. No. 9-200-002). For the purposes of this
Note "the Islamic world" is understood to mean countries in which Muslims constitute the
majority of the population, and in which Islamic law, Shari ah, governs either formally or
informally to some extent.
13. See John Inglis & Nadim Khan, Must Try Harder, PROJECT FIN., Oct. 2004, at 30,
30 ("Islamic finance has been a source of funds for many years, but it is only in the last few
years that a product range has been developed that allows it to be applied in the Middle East-
ern project finance market."); see also Mohammed El Qorchi, Islamic Finance Gears Up, FIN.
& DEV., Dec. 2005, at 46, 46 (noting that the number of Islamic financial institutions in the
world has grown from one in 1975 to over 300 in 2005).
14. See, e.g., McMillen, supra note 2, at 1186 ("A significant limiting factor relates to
the conflict of certain Islamic principles with the fundamental debt-leverage principle of
Western project financing. . . .").
15. See Michael Marray, Deeper Pockets, PROJECT FIN., Apr. 2005, at 33, 35 (noting
that some governments in the Middle East "are currently awash in oil Dollars [sic]" and will
do some projects on balance sheet, but will tap into "Islamic lease" structures for other larger
projects); see also El Qorchi, supra note 13, at 46 (noting that the growth in Islamic finance is
due to (1) demand for Shari'ah-compliant financial services from a large number of immi-
grant and non-immigrant Muslims, (2) growing oil wealth, and (3) the competitiveness of the
products to both Muslim and non-Muslim investors).
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For Muslims, Islam governs and prescribes rules for all aspects of
human life, including the economic aspects of banking and finance.'6
The body of law that guides the life and conduct of the Muslim is known
as Shari'ah. Rather than a codified body of law, Shari'ah is a continual
interpretation of religious law. In Islamic finance, Shari ah first pro-
vides for two general principles: risk sharing and the promotion of social
and economic welfare." From these two general principles derive five
specific rules of Islamic finance: (1) riba, which is interest, making
money from money, or unlawful gain, is prohibited; (2) gharar, which is
speculation, uncertainty, or excessive risk taking, is prohibited; (3) the
lender must share in the profits or losses that arise out of the activity for
which money is lent; (4) money has no intrinsic value, or time value,
such that transactions must be asset-backed; and (5) investments should
only support activities that are not themselves forbidden, such as the
production of pork, alcohol, or tobacco.'9
B. Potential for Islamic Project Finance
These five principles have caused difficulty for Western project fi-
nanciers who would like to undertake projects in the Islamic world, as
well as for project financiers from the Islamic world that would like to
invest their capital in projects in other parts of the world. Yet these barri-
ers belie the tremendous potential for Islamic project financing,20 both
within and outside of the Islamic world. Within the Islamic world, there
are numerous possibilities for project financing related to all phases of
oil and gas production, from upstream projects associated with the ex-
traction of hydrocarbons, such as the development and operation of oil
fields, to downstream projects associated with oil and gas activities that
take place after the oil and gas is removed from the ground, such as
transportation, refining, and developing petrochemical plants.' In addi-
tion, project financing within the Islamic world has been used outside of
16. See ZAMIR IQBAL & ABBAS MIRAKHOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 1-2 (2007).
17. See Qureshi & Millet, supra note 12, at 2.
18. Ali Adnan Ibrahim, The Rise of Customary Businesses in International Financial
Markets: An Introduction to Islamic Finance and the Challenges of International Integration,
23 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 661, 664 (2008).
19. See Scheherazade S. Rehman, Globalization of Islamic Finance Law, 25 Wis. INT'L
L.J. 625, 630-31 (2008); Kelly Holden, Note, Islamic Finance: "Legal Hypocrisy" Moot
Point, Problematic Future Bigger Concern, 25 B.U. INT'L L.J. 341, 346-47 (2007).
20. As used in this Note, "Islamic project financing" or "Islamic project finance" means
project financing in which at least some of the sources of financing for the project are compli-
ant with the tenants of Shariah. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
21. See Christopher F. Richardson, Islamic Finance Opportunities in the Oil and Gas
Sector: An Introduction to an Emerging Field, 42 TEx. INT'L ..J. 119, 120 & nn. I & 4
(2006).
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the oil and gas industry for the construction of desalination plants,22 alu-
minum smelters,23 power projects, and the construction and operation of
toll roads. 25 The breadth, scope, and variety of these projects should
come as no surprise considering that the Islamic world stretches from
Morocco to Indonesia and Muslims comprise almost a fourth of the
world's population.
There is also great potential for Islamic project finance outside of the
Islamic world, as many Muslims and governments in the Islamic world
are beginning to look for Shari'ah-compliant investment possibilities
27
outside of their home countries. Investing in project finance opportuni-
ties represent one such possibility. Given the experience and familiarity
of the countries in the Middle East with the oil and gas industry, projects
in this sector outside of the Islamic world would be attractive to Islamic
investors. In fact, Islamic project financing has already supported one
such project in the Gulf of Mexico for the drilling and operating of oil
wells, thus showing the potential for future such projects. 8 In addition,
commercial real estate projects are another possibility for Islamic project
finance in the United States, and Islamic project financing has already
contributed to several such projects.29 Although outside of the traditional
scope of project finance, it is worth noting the inroads that Islamic bank-
ing practices are making outside of the Islamic world.30 These projects
and trends show that despite decades of misunderstanding and uncer-
tainty, Islamic financial practices are becoming better known and
accepted throughout the world. As the general level of knowledge about
Islamic finance and banking increases, its use in project finance will
likely increase as well.
This potential for successful Islamic project finance highlights the
importance of Islamic finance law and the unique concerns that it pre-
sents. Some of these concerns include: the unpredictable nature of
Shari'ah advisory board decisions, conflicts relating to the Islamic lend-
er's need to retain title in the project assets and the Western lender's
need for a security interest, the Islamic lender's need to share in the
22. See, e.g., Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, Gulf Grower, PROJECT FIN., Sept. 2002, at 40,
40.
23. See, e.g., infra Part IV.A.3.
24. See, e.g., infra Part IV.A.2.
25. See, e.g., Dominic Jones, Cheap and Deep, PROJECT FIN., May 2001, at 47, 49.
26. See supra note 12.
27. See supra note 15.
28. See infra Part IV.B.2.
29. See infra Part IV.B.1.
30. See, e.g., Samuel G. Freedman, A Hometown Bank Heeds a Call to Serve Its Islamic
Clients, N.Y TIEs, Mar. 6, 2009, at A9 (discussing how University Bank, a small, regional
bank in Ann Arbor, Michigan, developed Shari'ah-compliant financial products for its Muslim
consumer banking clientele).
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project risk in the face of risk aversion on the part of Western lenders,
and the variability in regulatory structures throughout the Islamic
world.31 Understanding both the Shari'ah-compliant financing tools and
the problems that they present will allow increased participation by
Western investors in projects in the Islamic world as well as increased
participation by Islamic investors in the West. This is desirable because it
allows Islamic governments and companies to diversify their investment
activities and avails Western investors of a new source of capital at a
time when traditional credit markets are less able to lend than in years
past.
This Note will survey Islamic finance and banking practices to show
that the main consideration for structuring Shari 'ah-compliant project
financing is to ensure that the Islamic financier retains title in the pro-
ject's operating assets. Structuring projects to accommodate this
requirement allows for traditional Western financing to cooperate in pro-
ject finance with Islamic financing, and overcomes most Shari'ah
prohibitions. Title retention for the Islamic participants not only facili-
tates the participation of Western interests in projects in the Islamic
world, but also allows for the participation of Shari 'ah-compliant financ-
ing in countries outside of the Middle East, including the United States.
Part I of this Note will provide a general background to Shari'ah, its
economic principles, and its application to project finance. Part II will
address potential problem areas that are idiosyncratic to participation in
Islamic project finance, including the need for the Islamic participants to
retain title in the underlying project assets. Part III will describe Islamic
financing tools and how those tools have been applied to project finance
to facilitate title retention. Part IV will examine some past project financ-
ings that used Islamic financing tools with both Islamic and Western
participants in order to demonstrate how allowing for some form of title
retention on the part of the Islamic participants helps assure Shari ah
compliance. Finally, this Note will conclude by reemphasizing the im-
portance of the retention of title in some or all of the project assets for
the Islamic financiers, and discussing the benefits to project finance from
the sources of wealth and resources in the Islamic world. In the end,
learning how to facilitate the retention of title for the Islamic financier
makes it possible to overcome most of the Shari'ah restrictions as well
as many of the potential problem areas associated with Islamic project
finance.
31. See infra Part II.
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I. Shari'ah AND ITS APPLICATION
TO PROJECT FINANCE
A. The Sources of Shari'ah and the
Islamic Economic System
"[I]n the West ... theology does not directly regulate commercial
endeavors and remains generally divorced from the marketplace, [but]
Shari'ah is intended to dictate all behavior undertaken by Muslims, in-
cluding business affairs."" Finance and banking are not exceptions; thus,
it is important to gain an understanding of Shari'ah law and how it ap-
plies to project finance. Unlike a codified body of law, Shari'ah is not
centralized, collected, and conveniently published. Instead, it an ever-
expanding body of law that, similar to the common law, is based on the
interpretation of jurists."
Shari'ah is comprised of two primary and two secondary sources of
legal authority.3 The first, and most important, is the Quran." Muslims
believe the Quran to be the word of God communicated through the
Prophet Muhammad.36 Legal injunctions in the Quran are scattered
throughout its verses, and it is frequently necessary to consult several
verses in order to derive meaning from the Quran." Often times, the Qu-
ran is nevertheless ambiguous about certain topics, especially those
involving social conditions that have changed drastically since the Quran
was written during the period of years spanning 610 through 632 C.E.
The Quran declared that the prophetic traditions, or the Sunnah, were to
be followed, thus when the Quran is ambiguous, investigation should
proceed to the Sunnah."
The Sunnah comprises the Prophet Muhammad's acts, sayings, and
anything he tacitly approved, all of which were, according to the Quran,
divinely inspired." Most of these prophetic traditions were compiled and
written down after his lifetime, which helps explain why there are sev-
eral competing compilations of these traditions.4' These prophetic
traditions are considered the second most authoritative source and either
32. Ayman H. Abdel-Khaleq & Christopher F. Richardson, New Horizons for Islamic
Securities: Emerging Trends in Sukuk Offerings, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 409, 411 (2007).
33. See Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 673-85.
34. See id. at 675-76.
35. Id. at 675.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 676-77.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 677-78.
40. Id. at 675-76.
41. See id. at 678-79.
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confirm the Quran, explain it, clarify it, or "comprise independent rul-
ings that cannot be traced back to the Quran."4
After these two primary sources, Shari ah begins to resemble the
classic common law, and the sources that follow are known as fiqh or
"human comprehension of Shari'ah, the divine law."" If the Quran and
the Sunnah offer no guidance, the third source of Shari'ah is the "un-
animous consensus of juristic opinion," or the ijma.4 Thus, once there is
widespread opinion among Islamic jurists on an issue, that consensus
becomes binding authority itself such that its reliance on primary author-
ity is no longer necessary." As universal consensus on an issue is
extremely difficult to achieve, there are few instances of the true ijma.
Nonetheless, it has aided in the development of standardized legal theory
in Shari'ah.48
The final source of Shari'ah is juristic and analogical reasoning, ijti-
had and qiyas, respectively.49 The scope of juristic reasoning, ijtihad, is
to infer meaning from the unclear text of the Quran and the Sunnah and
apply that meaning to problems that Shari'ah has not previously ad-
dressed.o Similarly, analogical reasoning, qiyas, "is one of the main
avenues of evolution for Shari ah" and involves the extension of a legal
injunction from its original case to an analogous situation in a new
51
case.
In the context of finance and banking, fiqh is the most important
source of Shari'ah. Most Islamic financial institutions, as well as many
Western institutions that do business in the Islamic world, will have Sha-
ri 'ah supervisory boards comprised of one or more Islamic scholars that
possess expertise in a certain field or type of financial transaction." After
examining a transaction, if the board finds the transaction to be Sha-
ri'ah-compliant it will issue a legal opinion, orfatwa, as to the project's
compliance with Shari ah." Many, if not all, Islamic investors and finan-
42. Id. at 678.
43. See id. at 682-83.
44. McMillen, supra note 2, at 1190.
45. Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 679.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 680.
48. Qureshi & Millet, supra note 12, at 2.
49. Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 680-82.
50. Id. at 680-81.
51. Qureshi & Millet, supra note 12, at 2; Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 681.
52. McMillen, supra note 2, at 1190.
53. See Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 685-87. According to Islamic law, advisory boards
should not receive remuneration, other than administrative costs, from the company seeking
the fatwa; however, this is often not the case in modem practice. See id. at 687. Moreover,
financial and transactional teams seeking a fatwa often do not disclose all the relevant infor-
mation to the advisory board, resulting in "opinions based on limited information." Id. at 688.
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cial institutions will not proceed with a project or transaction until a
fatwa is issued.- Fatwas are generally announced publicly, so like the
common law, they allow for the replication of the product design or pro-
ject structure for which they were issued." Yet, as will be discussed
below in greater detail, Shari'ah boards do not always follow precedent
from previous fatwas, and will sometimes issue opinions that question or
56disapprove of previously approved practices.
Shari'ah raises unique issues as applied to finance and banking."
Broadly speaking, Islamic economic systems should: (1) seek to balance
economic growth with economic justice, (2) promote prosperity and job
creation, and (3) lead to the further adoption of Islamic economic and
financial practices." As noted in the first point, "Islamic finance is based
on an understanding of economic justice." 9 For example, prohibitions
against interest are in part based on a belief that lending money should
be a charitable act. 0 In like manner, prohibitions against excessive levels
of risk and uncertainty come from beliefs that excessive risk taking di-
verts attention away from productive occupations, and that the focus
should be on the social relationships inherent in a monetary transaction
rather than on the objects of those transactions themselves.6' These
Scholars and experts have yet to reach a consensus on how to resolve these and other ethical
issues in Islamic finance. See id.
54. See McMillen, supra note 2, at 1190-91.
55. See Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 688-89.
56. Robin Wigglesworth, Special Report, Sharia Compliance Rulings Reverse Trend,
FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 8, 2009, at 3.
57. See Cole Beyer Richins, Comment, Shariah Compliant Securities: American Law-
yers Meet Islamic Finance, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 135, 140-42 (2008).
58. See Rehman, supra note 19, at 629. From these three general goals are extracted
fifteen specific principles of the Islamic economic system:
(1) Equal economic opportunities for all members of society; (2) Economic equity;
(3) Economic freedom; (4) Personal property rights and sanctity of contracts; (5)
Job creation for all that can and want to work and equal availability of employment;
(6) Equal availability of education; (7) General economic prosperity; (8) Poverty
prevention and reduction; (9) Basic needs fulfillment of food, shelter, clothing and
rest; (10) Alms giving to charity; (11) Taxation to meet the unfulfilled needs of so-
ciety and to address social issues generally; (12) Appropriate management of
natural and depletable resources to benefit all members of current and future gen-
erations; (13) Abolition of corrupt practices; (14) Establishment of a supportive
financial system and financial practices that include the abolition of interest; (15)
The effectiveness of the state in achieving the above.
Id. at 630.
59. Bjorn Sorenson, Ethical Money: Financial Growth in the Muslim World, 23 Am. U.
INT'L L. REv. 647, 649 (2008).
60. See Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 701.
61. See Sorenson, supra note 59, at 650 ("Though Islamic financial instruments do not
allow for the spectacular gains and collapses that regularly churn through the capitalist econ-
omy, they do excel morally by integrating ethics into the financial system. Where capitalism
579Spring 2011]
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examples show that Islamic notions of economic justice influence the
determination of permitted as well as prohibited Islamic financial prac-
tices. While these economic tenants and prohibitions apply to Islamic
banking and finance in general, it is important to understand not only
61
what they are, but also, their implications for project finance.
B. The Fundamental Principles of Islamic Finance
As mentioned in the Introduction, there are five major rules in Is-
lamic finance that affect project financing: (1) riba, or interest, is
prohibited; (2) gharar, or excessive risk taking, is prohibited; (3) profits
or losses of the transaction must be shared; (4) transactions must be as-
set-backed because money has no intrinsic value; and (5) investments
should only support activities that are not themselves forbidden.6 ' These
rules obviously have profound implications for the traditional structure
of project finance activities, thus necessitating the examination of each
rule in further detail.
"Riba literally means increase," and in the context of a loan transac-
tion it implies "a gain from a debt which merely arises through the
passage of time by reference to the use of money itself.*"6 Sometimes it
is divided into two similar concepts of "making money from money" and
"any predetermined payment over and above the actual amount of prin-
rewards a risk-taking individual, Islamic finance ... limits risk for the betterment of society as
a whole.").
62. See Richins, supra note 57, at 138-39 (noting the lawyer's ethical duty to under-
stand Shari'ah when working with clients in the Middle East).
63. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also MUHAMMAD TAQI USMANI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE, at xiii-xviii (2002) (describing some of the principles
and precepts of Islamic finance and also some of the main differences between Islamic finance
and Western banking and financial practices). The concept of asset-backed financing as it
relates to Western notions of finance and banking is summed up with the following:
One of the most important characteristics of Islamic financing is that it is an asset-
backed financing. The conventional/capitalist concept of financing is that the banks
and financial institutions deal in money and monetary papers only. That is why they
are forbidden, in most countries, from trading in goods and making inventories. Is-
lam, on the other hand, does not recognize money as a subject-matter of trade,
except in some special cases. Money has no intrinsic utility; it is only a medium of
exchange; each unit of money is 100 per cent equal to another unit of the same de-
nomination, therefore, there is no room for making profit through the exchange of
these units inter se. Profit is generated when something having intrinsic utility is
sold for money or when different currencies are exchanged one for another. The
profit earned through dealing in money (of the same currency) or the papers repre-
senting them is interest, hence prohibited. Therefore, unlike conventional financial
institutions, financing in Islam is always based on non-liquid assets which creates
real assets and inventories.
Id. at xiv-xv (emphasis added).
64. DENTON WILDE SAPTE LLP, ISLAMIC FINANCE 2 (2009) (on file with author).
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cipal."6 Shari'ah scholars consider either the paying or receiving of in-
terest as usury. Islam considers riba to be unjust because it allows the
lender to gain without assuming any of the risks associated with the
transaction." In the traditional notion of project finance, lenders lend to
the SPV, which in turn uses the funds to purchase the project assets to
generate a revenue stream and pay back the loan with interest.67 The abil-
ity to receive interest payments on loans is especially important in
project finance where there may pass a considerable amount of time be-
fore the SPV is able to service its debt.& Although Islamic finance has
developed tools that are functional equivalents of interest payments, the
strict prohibition against interest-bearing debt is central to Islamic fi-
nance, and is a major obstacle for project finance.
Whereas the prohibition on riba is relatively easy to interpret and
understand, the prohibition against gharar, or speculation, uncertainty,
or excessive risk taking, is a much grayer concept. Under the prohibition
against gharar, a contract is viewed as lacking mutual consent of the
parties if the "existence, price, quantity or characteristics of the goods
for sale are unknown or unspecified."70 Moreover, contracts that have
vague obligations based on conditions relating to events outside the con-
trol of the parties would likely be disallowed.7 ' Every contract contains a
certain degree of uncertainty, and it will be up to Shari'ah supervisory
boards to determine what amount of uncertainty is acceptable.72 An ex-
ample of a type of project that would likely be acceptable would include
a power project in which the host government or corporation agrees in an
off-take agreement73 to purchase a specific amount of electricity over a
defined period of time at a previously agreed upon price.74 Yet, an unac
ceptable project would be a commercial farm where future years' crops
are sold with forward contracts on pricing terms based upon the future
spot price. Such a project would entail the sale of goods that are not yet
65. Rehman, supra note 19, at 631.
66. See DENTON WILDE SAPTE LLP, supra note 64, at 2.
67. See Mansoor H. Khan, Designing an Islamic Model for Project Finance, 16 INT'L
FIN. L. REV. 13, 14 (1997).
68. See id.
69. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Muezzin's Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On the Ne-
cessity of Realism in the Study of Islamic Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 423, 447-48 (2008).
70. DENTON WILDE SAYTE LLP, supra note 64, at 2.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. See NIEHUss, supra note 1, at 92-98 (discussing off-take contracts). "There are two
main ways that a project generates income: selling output under a purchase contract or charg-
ing for the use of project facilities under a user contract. For convenience, these two types of
contracts are often combined and considered together under the generic name of offtake [sic]
contract." Id. at 92.
74. See Khan, supra note 67, at 14-16.
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in existence at undetermined prices; thus, it might be deemed to entail a
prohibited level of gharar."
Gharar is also problematic in project finance because it is generally
interpreted to prohibit derivative contracts, Western-style security inter-
16
ests, and insurance. With respect to derivative contracts, this limits a
SPV's ability to insulate itself from various risks in the form of price
volatility on both the productionlinput side of the project, as well as on
the off-take/sale side of the project." Moreover, the Islamic financiers
are completely exposed to default risk if they do not have an adequate
security interest," and without insurance, they are exposed to the poten-
tial to suffer total loss from natural disasters.7 9 All of these instruments
are gharar due to the fact that they are deemed to entail a large amount
of uncertainty because, although their price "[is] certain, . . . the benefit
to be derived from them [is] not."o There are forms of Shari'ah-
compliant collateral security structures,8' as well as insurance contracts,82
but with the exception of some very limited forms of forward-sale
83
contracts, derivatives, such as swaps and options, are generally prohib-
75. See DENTON WILDE SAPTE LLP, supra note 64, at 17-18 (describing how salam
contracts enable the forward sale of goods not yet in existence, but that the purchase price
must be paid immediately upon contracting, thus precluding the possibility of a price based on
future benchmarks).
76. See Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 702-03. But see Michael J.T. McMillen, Richard
Fagerer & Michael E. Pikiel, The 2010 Tahawwut Master Agreement: Paving the Way for
Shari'ah-Compliant Hedging Products 6-16 (Aug. 21, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1670118 (discussing the 2010 Tahawwut
Master Agreement as a standardized form that could allow for certain kinds of Shari 'ah-
compliant swaps and derivative contracts).
77. See YESCOMBE, supra note 5, § 6.1.1, at 70-71, § 8.8.1, at 161, § 8.8.3, at 163,
§ 8.9, at 170-74 (describing input supply risks, off-take risks, and the use of derivatives to
hedge against those risks).
78. See id. § 13.7, at 308 (discussing the use of security interests in project finance).
"There is seldom any substantial disagreement between Sponsors [sic] and lenders about the
latter's right to take security over all physical assets ... which the [SPV] has." Id. § 13.7.1, at
309. In the event of default in project finance, lenders do not expect to recoup their investment
from the sale of the SPV assets. Investments in project finance are made on the expected cash
flows from the operation of the SPV, not on the value of the SPV's assets themselves. How-
ever, security over the project assets remains important for other reasons, including ensuring
that lenders are involved in the early stages of the project if things begin to go wrong, and
preventing the SPV assets from being sold without the lenders' consent. Id. § 13.7, at 308.
79. See id. § 7.6.1, at 127-29, § 8.10.1, at 175-76 (discussing the role of insurance in
project finance to cover the risk of a catastrophic loss).
80. Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 702.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 135-138, Part IV.A. 1 (discussing a project utiliz-
ing the rahn-adl collateral security structure).
82. See Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 715-16 (discussing takaful, or Shariah-compliant
insurance).
83. See Richardson, supra note 21, at 127; see also DENTON WILDE SAPrE LLP, supra
note 64, at 17-18 (discussing a form of Shari'ah-compliant forward contract known as a sa-
lam).
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ited." Thus, the ability to use derivatives to hedge risk is limited in Is-
lamic project finance.
For the purposes of project finance, the rules that the lender must
share in the profit and loss of the transaction and that all transactions
must be asset-backed are inherently linked in a manner that highlights
the importance of retention of title on the part of the Islamic financiers.
Given the view of lending money as a charitable act and the prohibition
on the charging of interest as an exploitative activity,5 the asset underly-
ing the transaction will be the central focus of the transaction, and the
Islamic lender will be subject to the risks of the asset through the reten-
tion of its title in some form or another. 6 Many Islamic transactions
therefore are derived from a basic form in which the lender takes title to
or purchases the asset in the transaction, and then leases it back to the
purchaser who will acquire title to the asset after a specified number of
lease periods." This makes the project asset-backed from the perspective
of the Islamic lenders rather than the SPV. If the SPV does not generate
profit for the project sponsors, the Islamic lenders will also not receive
lease payments from the lease of the project assets to the SPV.88 In this
way, the transaction forces the Islamic lenders to bear the risk of the pro-
ject's failure."
Finally, Shari'ah explicitly forbids some activities as haram, mean-
ing that they are harmful and socially offensive.mSuch goods or activities
include pork-related products, tobacco, alcohol, pornography, casinos,
and gambling.9' Any project aiming to directly produce such products or
to indirectly facilitate the production of such products or activities would
likely be prohibited under Shari'ah.92 This requirement can become an
issue in the construction and operation of commercial real estate if, for
example, a restaurant in a hotel wants to serve alcohol or food with pork
84. Richardson, supra note 21, at 127. But see McMillen, Fagerer & Pikiel, supra note
76, at 6-16 (discussing the possibility for some kinds of Shari'ah-compliant swaps and deriva-
tive contracts through the use of the 2010 Tahawutt Master Agreement).
85. Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 701.
86. See Rehman, supra note 19, at 631-32 (describing the necessity of Islamic investors
to share in the risk of a venture in order to realize a return and discussing the importance of
asset-backed financing in Islamic finance); see also Holden, supra note 19, at 346-48 (de-
scribing Islamic transactions as "Profit-Loss sharing" and providing examples of how Islamic
banks would finance certain activities).
87. See Rehman, supra note 19, at 634-37.
88. See Rahail Ali & Rustum Shah, Square Peg Can Fit a Round Hole, PROJECT FIN.,
Dec. 2004/Jan. 2005, at 2, 4.
89. See id.
90. DENTON WILDE SAPTE LLP, supra note 64, at 3.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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in it.93 Yet typically, as long as such noncompliance is de minimis, as in
the case of one restaurant that serves alcohol in a large commercial real
estate project, the noncompliant activity will be overlooked or allowed.94
In other cases, Shari'ah boards will find that noncompliant projects are
susceptible to "cleansing." For example, if an Islamic lender is entitled to
interest payments from late rental payments from a tenant, the lender
could "cleanse" or "purify" the transaction by refusing the interest in-
come or by accepting it and donating it to charity.5
In sum, Shari'ah dictates a number of economic precepts and princi-
ples for Islamic financiers and Western lenders who undertake projects
in the Islamic world. These economic principles, together with the
common law-like evolution of Shari'ah, leave five rules of Islamic fi-
nance that are applicable to project finance. However, these rules create a
number of potential problem areas for Islamic project finance, some of
which are unique to Islamic finance. While these problem areas may pre-
sent unique considerations for Islamic project finance, they are not
insurmountable, especially if the project financing structure accommo-
dates the Islamic participants' need to retain some degree of title in the
project assets.
II. POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS IN ISLAMIC FINANCE
Islamic project finance is an emerging field with unsolved problems
that become more pronounced when the needs of Islamic lenders
conflict with those of Western lenders. When undertaking Shari'ah-
compliant projects that attempt to fit Western debt tranches along side of
Islamic debt tranches, there are at least four potential sources of
problems:96 (1) uncertainty regarding the somewhat unpredictable and
93. See, e.g., Michael J.T. McMillen, Asset Securitization Sukuk and Islamic Capital
Markets: Structural Issues in These Formative Years, 25 Wis. INT'L L.J. 703, 724 (2008).
94. See id. at 727-28.
95. See id. at 725.
96. In addition to the four potential problem areas discussed in this Section, there are at
least two other potential sources of problems for Western participants in Islamic project fi-
nance. The first is the possibility of civil liability and criminal exposure that could result for
Western participants. See David Yerushalmi, Shari'ah's "Black Box": Civil Liability and
Criminal Exposure Surrounding Shari'ah-Compliant Finance, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1019,
1062-1105 (2008). In short, if a public company, or a private company that later goes public,
is involved in Shariah-compliant project financing, they will want to err on the side or cau-
tion in determining what facts related to the project are material for Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) disclosure purposes. See id. at 1084-87. Otherwise the corporation could
face civil liability for failure to disclose material facts under SEC rules, while the corporate
officers, executives, and counsel could also face both criminal and civil liability. See id. at
1048-50.
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subjective nature of the decisions of Shari'ah boards,7 (2) the lack of an
overarching regulatory body for Islamic banking and finance,8 (3) the
Islamic need to retain title in the project assets and the Western lender's
need for a security interest in those same assets," and, (4) the Islamic
requirement that the lender bear some of the project risk compared to the
Western lender's risk aversion. *
While the issue of retention of title on the part of the Islamic finan-
ciers does not bear on most of these issues, it is itself a potential source
of problems in Islamic projects with Western participants. It inhibits
Western lenders from taking an effective security interest in the project
assets.o'0 This, in turn, increases the risk from the perspective of Western
lenders because it hinders their recourse in the event of default.'" An
understanding of the problems that could arise from title retention and
the other potential sources of problems will lessen the probability that an
otherwise well-financed and bankable project will fall victim to an un-
foreseen and misfortunate contingency.o3
Another potential source of problems stems from the inapplicability of Shari ah in a
choice of law clause. See generally Michael J.T. McMillen, Contractual Enforceability Issues:
Sukuk and Capital Markets Development, 7 CHm. J. INT'L L. 427, 441-47 (2007). In the Eng-
lish case Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd., the dispute in question
revolved around a series of ijara agreements in which the governing law provision in each
agreement stated, "Subject to the principles of Glorious Sharia'a, this Agreement shall be
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England." Shamil Bank of Bahrain
EC v. Beximco Pharm. Ltd., [2004] EWCA (Civ) 19, [1], [2004] 4 All E.R. 1072 at 1074
(Eng.). In dealing with the governing law issue, the court concluded that only one body of law
can govern the contract, that only the law of a country can be chosen, and that simply refer-
encing the "Glorious Sharia'a" was not referencing the laws of a nation. See id. If] 40-48, 54-
55. Thus, it is not clear that Shari'ah is applicable as a choice of law to govern an agreement.
Cf The Inv. Dar Co. v. Blom Dev. Bank, SAL, [2009] EWHC (Ch) 3545, [16] (Eng.) (concur-
ring with the trial court that The Investment Dar Company's (TID) contention that the
agreement was not Shari'ah-compliant and therefore void was "an arguable case"). See gener-
ally Robin Wigglesworth, Court Concession Raises Islamic Finance Risk, FIN. TIMES, Mar.
25, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/aa3dd5c4-382d-Ildf-8420-00144feabdcO.html (noting
that the uncertainty created by the decision in the TID case raises the Shari'ah risk for dealing
with Islamic institutions).
97. See Wigglesworth, supra note 56, at 3.
98. See Holden, supra note 19, at 362-65.
99. See McMillen, supra note 2, at 1205-06.
100. See Rehman, supra note 19, at 631; Holden, supra note 19, at 346-49.
101. See YESCOMBE, supra note 5, § 13.7.1, at 309-11 (discussing how problems could
arise for lenders who wish to take an effective security interest in the project assets if the SPV
does not actually own those assets).
102. Cf id. at 309 (noting that if lenders cannot take an effective security interest, they
can rely on contract assignments); McMillen, supra note 2, at 1206 (describing how a sound
security structure decreases transactional risks and financing costs).
103. See generally Richins, supra note 57, at 135-47.
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A. Potential Regulatory Issues in Islamic Finance
The first two potential problem areas are related, and deal with the
centrality of Shari'ah-compliance boards and the lack of an overarching
regulatory structure in Islamic finance. These two problems could loose-
ly be referred to as "regulatory issues." In the first instance, despite some
similarity between the evolution of both Shari'ah and the common law,
there is no doctrine of stare decisis with respect to Shari'ah board deci-
sions.'" When a Shari'ah board in one government or corporation issues
a fatwa, it is only valid for the specific instance for which it was is-
sued.o' In approving transactions, a Shari'ah board will consider similar
transactions for which fatwas were issued, but prior approval of a similar
transaction is no guarantee of approval for the transaction in question."
Moreover, the opinions of prominent scholars in the field of Islamic fi-
nance can have a profound effect on the decisions of Shari'ah advisory
boards. In late 2007 and early 2008, Sheikh Taqi Usmani, then chairman
of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Insti-
tutions (AAOIFI) and one of the most respected scholars in the field of
Islamic finance, issued statements claiming that as many as eighty-five
percent of sukuko' were probably not Shari'ah-compliant because they
contained repurchase agreements. 08 This contributed to a slowdown in
the Islamic debt market as "the sudden disapproval of previously ac-
cepted structures ... sparked uncertainty."'" Compounding the problem
is the fact that growth in the Islamic finance industry has led to a growth
in the number of Shari'ah boards with often differing opinions as to the
permissibility of some practices."o Yet the industry lacks a single pan-
Islamic forum in which Shari'ah scholars and financial regulators can
discuss and reach consensus on these issues."'
This lack of a forum for reaching consensus is part of the second
problem with Islamic finance: the lack of a cohesive regulatory body."2
In addition to the regulation of capital market products and financing
structures, areas of regulation could include Shari'ah certification, the
establishment of Shari'ah boards, qualifications for Shari'ah advisors,
104. See McMillen, supra note 2, at 1184.
105. See id. at 1190-91.
106. See Wigglesworth, supra note 56, at 3.
107. Loosely defined, a sukuk is a Shari'ah-compliant bond. See infra Part m.A.3.
108. See Jason Benham, Islamic Bond Market "Wrecked" by Critical Remarks, ARABI-
ANBUSINESS.COM, Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/536401-islamic-bond-
market-wrecked-by-critical-remarks.
109. Wigglesworth, supra note 56, at 3.
110. See id.
111. See Holden, supra note 19, at 362; Wigglesworth, supra note 56, at 3.
112. See Wigglesworth, supra note 56, at 3.
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and disclosure issues."' The lack of regulation in these areas "could in-
hibit the development and expansion of uniform Islamic financial
services by limiting cross-border flows and could encourage fractional-
ization among interpretation and region."1 1 4 Arguably then, the lack of
regulation could make Islamic finance more country-specific or even
Shari'ah board-specific, which would limit the potential sources of capi-
tal within the Islamic world from which one project could draw.
Some regions of the Islamic world have supervisory and regulatory
systems in place. For example, the AAOIFI, based in Bahrain, publishes
the widely followed Shari'ah Standards, and the Islamic Financial Ser-
vices Board publishes various technical standards for financial
institutions."' Other institutions include the International Islamic Finan-
cial Market, the Liquidity Management Center, and the International
Islamic Rating Agency."'6 "Though many agencies are interested in fa-
cilitating the future of Islamic financing by providing regulatory
framework[s], there still is no universal set of rules to abide by.""' Regu-
lating the financial industry is complicated enough when the main
players are various national governments,"' central bankers, and the pri-
vate sector, but the task is further complicated by the need to reach
consensus among religious advisors from divergent backgrounds."' In
this vacuum, a narrow class of credible scholars, such as Sheikh Taqi
Usmani, holds considerable sway.' 20 Yet reliance upon scholars leads to
the uncertainty noted above when dealing with Shari'ah advisory
boards; it is simply hard to predict whether a transaction will be ap-
proved or whether one particular type of instrument will remain viable
over the long term."' Commentators have urged the need for uniform
standards, with one proposing a Model Islamic Acts,'22 but until there is
113. See Sorenson, supra note 59, at 655 (quoting Islamic Capital Market Task Force of
the International Organization of Securities Commissions, ISLAMIC CAPITAL MARKET FACT
FINDING REPORT 72-73 (2004), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD I 70.pdf).
114. Id.
115. See Holden, supra note 19, at 362-63.
116. See id. at 365.
117. Id.
118. The interpretation of Shari'ah also varies on a national level, with some countries
like Malaysia considered more lax in their interpretation, while other countries such as Paki-
stan and Iran are considered to prefer a more strict interpretation of Shari'ah. See Holden,
supra note 19, at 352-57.
119. See Robert R. Bianchi, The Revolution in Islamic Finance, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 569,
575 (2007).
120. See id.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 104-114.
122. See McMillen, supra note 96, at 458-60.
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such a uniform standard, regulatory uncertainty and Shari'ah-
compliance risk will be present in Islamic project finance.
B. Retention of Title and Risk Aversion
The concepts of retention of title and risk aversion will also be
points of conflict between Islamic financing tranches and Western debt
tranches. These problem areas are related in the sense that an Islamic
financier's need to retain title to the assets underlying the transaction
stems from the Shari'ah requirement that the financier share in the prof-
its and losses (i.e., the risks) that arise out of transaction.' Conversely,
Western lending practices do not call for retention of title of the SPV
assets, and Western lenders evaluate the projected cash flows from the
project to determine the likelihood of repayment.124 Instead of retaining
title, Western lenders will take a security interest in the project assets to
protect against the default risk from the SPV.1n In project finance, a se-
curity interest is a right of a lender "to possess and/or sell" the SPV's
project assets in order to satisfy the SPV's debt to the lender in the event
of default. 26 While no one expects that the security interest in the project
assets will completely cover the loan the lender made to the SPV, the
security interest does provide one layer of protection in the event of de-
fault.127 If the SPV defaults or goes bankrupt, the Western lenders'
security interest provides them with a claim to the SPV assets that takes
precedence over other unsecured lenders' claims.'
123. See Inglis & Khan, supra note 13, at 31 ("[S]ince the assets are owned by the Is-
lamic financier it should assume the risk of total loss."); Rehman, supra note 19, at 630-31
(describing the necessity of Islamic investors to share in the risk of a venture in order to
realize a return); Holden, supra note 19, at 346-48 (describing Islamic transactions as "Profit-
Loss Sharing" and providing examples of how Islamic banks would finance certain activities);
see also DENTON WILDE SAPTE LLP, supra note 64, at 16 ("Another important issue which is
often overlooked is the Islamic financier can only agree to sell a building to the customer if it
has some legal right to the land on which the building is to be constructed."); McMillen, supra
note 2, at 1205-06 (comparing the need for physical possession in order to perfect a security
interest under Shari'ah, with the English and American need for recordation in order to per-
fect the security interest). In this way, the Islamic financiers share the risk of the project and
collect rents as opposed to interest payments. From a structural perspective, this assures Sha-
ri'ah compliance. It will then only be necessary to ensure that the activity is not overly
speculative (gharar) and that the project activity is not forbidden (haram). See supra Part I.B.
124. See Khan, supra note 67, at 14-16.
125. See NIEHUsS, supra note 1, at 136-37.
126. Id.
127. See YESCOMBE, supra note 5, § 2.2, at 7, § 13.7, at 308, § 13.7.1, at 309.
128. See NIEHUSS, supra note 1, at 136-37; see also JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 3-1, at 117-18 (2007) (describing the
preference that a secured creditor takes in bankruptcy compared to an unsecured creditor).
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By comparison, in Islamic project finance, the lender will need to
take title to the SPV assets instead of a security interest. 2 9 If the SPV
defaults, the Islamic lender will already have title to the SPV's project
assets that the Islamic funds helped purchase. In this situation, the Is-
lamic lenders can likely dispose of the assets to partially or completely
satisfy the SPV's outstanding debt obligations.o Thus, from the lender's
perspective, a Western security interest and Islamic title retention func-
tion similarly if the SPV defaults. Nonetheless, in project finance, it is
unlikely that there will be one lender and one tranche of debt.'
In a project financed both through Islamic finance and Western fi-
nance, the Shari'ah requirement for retention of title will conflict with
the Western lender's ability to obtain a security interest in the same as-
sets financed through the lending transactions. 32 Sometimes the nature of
the project provides avenues to overcome this problem. For example, in
aluminum projects, Islamic tranches have funded and retained title to
specific smelters or production lines while Western debt funded the rest
of the project.' Similarly, in an oil and gas transaction in the United
States, the Islamic financiers retained a royalty interest that represented a
certain percentage of the mineral estate.'3 Islamic financial practices also
allow for the rahn-adl, which is a type of mortgage (rahn) arrangement
in which title to the asset is placed with a special type of agent (adl) who
would owe fiduciary duties to both the Islamic financier and the Western
lender.' The rahn-adl agreements typically only allow for dispositions
of the asset if both parties agree to such. In the case of default, the
agreement will specify the rights to the assets that each party will pos-
sess.'3 ' Thus, rahn-adl agreements allow for the Islamic lender to meet
the requirement of retention of title, albeit through an agent, while also
providing a security interest for the Western lenders.'3
129. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
130. Cf Inglis & Khan, supra note 13 (describing how in the event of a total loss, Is-
lamic financiers own the assets and therefore assume the risk of total loss).
131. See NIEHUSS, supra note 1, at 112-21 (stating that it is common that international
project financings in emerging markets will have a mix of debt sources, and describing some
of the different sources of debt, including Islamic finance).
132. See McMillen, supra note 2, at 1205-06.
133. See Susan Traill, Blending Islam, PROJECr FIN., Sept. 2005, at 29, 30 (discussing
projects funded by both Shari'ah-compliant financing and Western financing).
134. See Richardson, supra note 21, at 149-52.
135. See McMillen, supra note 2, at 1203-05, 1215-16; cf YESCOMBE, supra note 5,
§ 13.7.1, at 309 (noting that problems can arise for lenders in taking an effective security in-
terest in the project assets if the SPV does not own the project assets).
136. See McMillen, supra note 2, at 1215-16.
137. See id. at 1216 (discussing the use of grants to the adl in mortgage agreements that
allow for the adl to take action with respect to the property in the event of a default).
138. See id. at 1205-06.
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Yet, while the nature of the project, a rahn-adl agreement, or one of
the Islamic financing structures discussed in Part III can solve the reten-
tion of title problem for Islamic financiers, Western lenders will remain
risk averse, thus presenting additional challenges."' Advance rental
payments are one example of how Western lenders' risk aversion can
affect an Islamic project finance venture. Advance rental payments are
problematic under Shari'ah because a return on an investment cannot
derive from an asset that is not yet in existence.'" However, Western
lenders want to receive payments on their loans before the project assets
are completed, and forcing them to wait an extended period to receive
payment makes the project less attractive.14' Nonetheless, some Shari'ah
advisory boards allow for advance rental payments to be credited against
the lease payment once the lease term begins, either in a lump sum
amount or a pro rata amount over the whole term of the lease.142 Thus,
there could be solutions to the problem posed by the prohibition on ad-
vance rental payments.
Also, in retaining title to the SPV assets, the Islamic financiers retain
the risk of total loss.143 Yet, because they retain title, the Islamic financi-
ers will often have primary recourse to the insurance policies in place for
the project asset.'" This could give rise to inter-creditor issues by forcing
the Western lenders to also bear the risk of total loss because they have
limited or no recourse to the insurance policies.145 A common Shari'ah-
compliant solution is for the Islamic financiers to assign the insurance
proceeds to the SPV, and to require the SPV to use those insurance pro-
ceeds to replace all or some of the project assets in the event of a total
loss.'" In theory, this solution would minimize interruption to both the
Islamic and the Western financing packages.147
Thus these examples reiterate that it is possible for Western lenders
to mitigate the increased risk inherent in Shari 'ah-compliant project fi-
nancing.143 The fact that Shari'ah does not allow for advance rental
payments, and that retaining title places the risk of total loss on the Is-
lamic financier all increase the amount of project risk from the Western
lender's perspective. 149 Nonetheless, despite the tendency toward risk
139. See Inglis & Khan, supra note 13, at 30.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 30-31.
143. See id. at 31.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
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aversion on the part of Western lenders, the need for Islamic financiers to
retain some degree and form of title in the project assets has been re-
solved in various forms that do not require Western lenders to assume
prohibitive levels of risk. These forms include various structures that
place the physical asset at the center of the transaction, and thus facili-
tate the retention of title.
III. ISLAMIC FINANCING TOOLS IN PROJECT FINANCE
A project utilizing Islamic financing will likely also have Western fi-
nancing, and thus, will be a dual-tranche or multi-tranche project.so It is
possible for there to be projects financed completely through Islamic
financing, but given the preference for shorter-term investments in the
Islamic world, most such projects would likely be smaller in scale.'
Due to the capital needs in a typical large-scale infrastructure project,
there could be numerous tranches of debt, some Islamic and some West-
ern.15 2 Nonetheless, the assumption in this Note is that of a dual-tranche
project in which Islamic finance and Western finance cooperate. The
next step is therefore to understand the structures Islamic finance can
take, and the adaptation of those structures to the specific needs of pro-
ject finance.'" These structural combinations enable the retention of title
in all or part of the project assets on the part of the Islamic project part-
ners, and thus do much to help overcome all of the Shari'ah prohibitions
except for the prohibitions against activities that are considered haram,
or socially offensive.
A. Islamic Financing Tools
Islamic finance has developed a diverse array of tools and structures
to accommodate the requirements of Shari'ah, and in turn, facilitate the
retention of title for the project's Islamic lenders. As mentioned above,
most of these tools involve some form of cost-plus purchasing in which
the lending institution or financier actually purchases the asset or goods
in question, takes title (and in some cases possession), and then resells
them at a markup or leases them back to the original "purchaser" or
150. See McMillen, supra note 93, at 719 (discussing a split project structure in which
one portion is Shari'ah-compliant, and one portion is not); see also Traill, supra note 133, at
29 (discussing projects funded by both Shari'ah-compliant financing and Western financing).
151. See Traill, supra note 133, at 29.
152. See, e.g., id. (discussing the success of several larger projects, including a power
project and a water desalination plant upgrade in the United Arab Emirates along with an
expansion of an aluminum plant in Bahrain, in which Islamic tranches fit along side conven-
tional debt).
153. See Richins, supra note 57, at 142-44.
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"borrower."'1 Few of these structures are without criticism by more con-
servative Muslims for being too similar to Western lending practices."5
While it is true that many of these structures resemble traditional inter-
est-bearing transactions, these structures would not exist were it not for
the need to address the unique requirements of Islamic finance.16 More-
over, a focus on their resemblance to interest-bearing transactions
ignores the need for the lender to retain title to the asset underlying the
transaction, which starkly conflicts with the Western lender's desire for a
security interest in the same asset.17 To facilitate understanding, this
Section will first classify Islamic financing tools as similar to either debt
financing structures or equity financing structures, and discuss each
accordingly.' In addition, this Section will also explain Islamic asset-
backed securitization as this practice has grown in popularity in recent
years.' Lastly, the final portion of this Section will discuss how these
structures have been adapted and combined to address the unique cir-
cumstances of project finance to help facilitate the retention of title for
the Islamic financiers.
1. Islamic Debt-Like Instruments
The first Islamic financing tool is a murabaha contract in which a fi-
nancial institution purchases the asset in question, takes title to it, and
then resells it to the customer at a certain profit added to the cost. 6 ' This
profit is not prohibited interest because the financial institution assumes
the risk of purchasing and retaining title, and the customer is under no
obligation to subsequently buy the asset from the financial institution.'62
Thus, the profits from the murabaha derive from the risk that the cus-
tomer will not purchase the asset from the financial institution.163 Such
agreements are common for commodities purchases in which a com-
modity broker or end user lacks sufficient working capital,'" although
there are reports of murabaha financings for equity purchases and li-
154. Rehman, supra note 19, at 634-35.
155. See id. at 636.
156. See Qureshi & Millet, supra note 12, at 3-4.
157. See McMillen, supra note 2, at 1205-06 (comparing the need for physical posses-
sion in order to perfect a security interest under Shari'ah, with the English and American need
for recordation in order to perfect the security interest).
158. See Qureshi & Millet, supra note 12, at 4-5; infra Part III.A.1-2.
159. See Michael Marray, Sukuk and See, PROJECT FIN., Dec. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 24, 24;
infra Part UI.A.3.
160. See generally, McMillen, supra note 2.
161. See Holden, supra note 19, at 349-50.
162. Qureshi & Millet, supra note 12, at 5.
163. Id.
164. See DENTON WILDE SAPTE LLP, supra note 64, at 10-12.
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censing agreements in the telecom sector in the Middle East.'6 As such,
it may be possible to use murabaha in project finance to purchase expen-
sive capital equipment or to finance the purchase of raw materials such
as coal or bauxite.'6 Yet, Islamic institutions tend to prefer to enter into
murabaha agreements with familiar and trusted individuals, which could
limit their application to large projects."
Similar to Western lease financing, an ijara agreement is a leasing
arrangement in which a financial institution purchases an asset, retains
title, and then leases it to its client.'" The lease rate is marked up from
the purchase price and is also periodically reviewed and adjusted." The
markup and adjustments are justified because the financial institution
owns the asset in question throughout the lease term and retains the risk
associated with its performance.o Moreover, in contrast with Western
lease financing, the lessee is not liable for the full rent if the asset is de-
stroyed. Also, the lease term begins when the lessee receives the asset,
and not when the contract is signed. 72 Thus, there are differences with
Western lease financing. Finally, options to purchase the asset at the end
of the lease term are typically prohibited for excessive levels of uncer-
tainty, but ijara contracts do allow for upfront agreements in which the
client agrees to purchase the asset at the end of the lease term.73 As dis-
cussed below, ijara financing is commonly used in combination with
istisna'a financing to finance the operation and construction, respec-
tively, of the project assets.74
Istisna'a contracts involve an Islamic bank, a client, and a third party
that can create the commodity that the client wishes to purchase. These
agreements are common in project finance, and are typically found in
contracts between financial institutions and construction contractors
whereby the Islamic financial institution orders the construction contrac-
tor to construct the project assets either for the SPV or the project
sponsors.'" In project finance, the construction phase is a period of high
risk, yet under an istisna 'a this risk is perhaps even greater because the
purchase price must be fixed when the parties enter into the contract, and
165. See Traill, supra note 133, at 29.
166. See, e.g., DENTON WILDE SAFPE LLP, supra note 64, at 12 (discussing the use of
murabaha to purchase copper).
167. See Holden, supra note 19, at 349.
168. See id. at 350.
169. See id.; Qureshi & Millet, supra note 12, at 5.
170. Holden, supra note 19, at 350.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Qureshi & Millet, supra note 12, at 5.
174. See DENTON WILDE SAPTE LLP, supra note 64, at 13-15.
175. See Holden, supra note 19, at 352.
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variable rates of return are not allowed.' 6 In this way, the Islamic finan-
cial institution bears both the completion risk and the cost-of-funds risk,
although payments on the contract can be made on a deferred basis, ei-
ther at completion or following a predetermined set of construction
milestones."' Upon completion of the construction of the asset and trans-
fer of title to the Islamic financial institution, it will usually enter into a
parallel istisna'a or ijara at a markup with the SPV, who will purchase
or lease the commissioned asset from the Islamic financial institution
once its construction is completed."' Thus, the istisna'a highlights the
emphasis in Islamic finance on ensuring that the financial institution re-
tains title in the assets underlying the transaction in order to
subsequently sell it or lease it back to the SPV client.7 1
Salam contracts are similar to istisna'a contracts except that a salam
deals with fungible goods, and the purchase price must be paid in full
when the parties enter into the contract.'80 Thus, a salam is like a mura-
baha in that it typically deals with commodities, and it is like an
istisna'a in that when the contract is formed, the goods do not exist. 8 1
Essentially, a salam is a forward purchase agreement in which the parties
agree to future delivery of a fungible good for a price paid in advance.'82
Salam contracts are Shari'ah-compliant because the bank shares the
transaction's risk. There is a possibility that the bank will ultimately pos-
sess goods in the future for which there is not a ready market.'83 The
financial institution will typically take the goods and resell them to a
customer in a back-to-back salam, but the date of delivery from the bank
to the final customer must be after the date of delivery from the manu-
facturer to the bank.'" Finally, to avoid gharar, a salam contract cannot
describe the specific source of the goods, but it must describe them in
enough detail to enable the seller or the reselling financial institution to
perform their obligations; thus details as to "specification, quality, quan-
tity and other relevant details" will be important."' For example, in
project finance, an SPV power plant could use a salam contract to pur-
chase coal. To do so, it would want to specify the amount of coal,
176. DENTON WILDE SAPTE LLP, supra note 64, at 15-16.
177. See Qureshi & Millet, supra note 12, at 5.
178. See DENTON WILDE SAPTE LLP, supra note 64, at 15-16.
179. See id. at 16 ("Another important issue which is often overlooked is the Islamic
financier can only agree to sell a building to the customer if it has some legal right to the land
on which the building is to be constructed.").
180. Id. at 15.
181. Id. at 17.
182. See Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 714.
183. See Qureshi & Millet, supra note 12, at 5.
184. See DENTON WILDE SAPTE LLP, supra note 64, at 17-18.
185. Id. at 17.
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delivery date, and average degree of purity, but it would want to avoid
stipulating that the supplier must supply the coal from a specific mine.8 6
2. Islamic Equity-Like Instruments
Since the payment of dividends is not permitted under Shari ah, Is-
lamic equity-like structures resemble Western partnership agreements.'
Thus, the retention of title in the project assets is inherent in the owner-
ship interest that the partners take in the venture. The first such
agreement is a mudaraba agreement, which is analogous to a Western
trust financing agreement, 8 or a venture capital agreement.' In a muda-
raba, a financial institution will enter into an agreement with an
entrepreneur in which the bank will provide the capital and the entrepre-
neur will provide the management skills.'" Profits are distributed
according to a pre-negotiated proportion, but only after first settling all
liabilities.'9 ' The financial institution bears the risk of losing the capital
invested and the entrepreneur bears the opportunity cost of his efforts.'92
Due to the risks involved, Islamic financial institutions are very selective
in working with clients in a mudaraba agreement, and such agreements
therefore represent less than five percent of banking operations within
the Islamic world.' Nonetheless, it is a scheme that would be amenable
to project finance where an Islamic corporate conglomerate wishes to
undertake a project off-balance sheet, or where a financial institution
wishes to take an equity position in a project.194 To this end, "[t]he Is-
lamic Development Bank recently launched a 'US $1.5 billion
infrastructure fund' accessible via mudaraba transactions," thus showing
the potential for such transactions in the field of project finance.
The other principal form of Islamic equity-like financing is the mu-
sharaka, and it is very similar to the mudaraba, except that the financial
institution and the entrepreneur are not confined to distinct roles of capi-
tal provider and manager.'9 The financial institution will typically
provide some of the capital for the venture and the manager will provide
186. See id.
187. See Qureshi & Millet, supra note 12, at 5.
188. See id.
189. See Holden, supra note 19, at 351.
190. See Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 709-10.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 709.
193. See Holden, supra note 19, at 351.
194. See, e.g., McMillen, supra note 2, at 1232-36 (describing a project in which three
financial institutions formed a partnership with a power utility in order to fund a power project
through equity investments in the SPV assets).
195. Holden, supra note 19, at 351 (quoting Gohar Bilal, Islamic Finance: Alternatives
to the Western Model, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 145, 156 (1999)).
196. See Qureshi & Millet, supra note 12, at 5.
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the remaining capital and the management expertise.9 7 The parties then
will enter into to a profit-sharing agreement created at the formation of
the musharaka, and will share losses to the extent of their capital invest-
ment." Given that the financial institution will have an interest in the
partnership and in any assets that the partnership purchases, as well as
the fact that the financial institution bears risk to the extent of its capital
investment,'" musharaka agreements are typically Shari 'ah-compliant
unless the purpose of the partnership is to engage in some sort of forbid-
den activity.2m Musharaka agreements have potential for use in Islamic
project finance because they would permit the financial institution to
retain complete or partial title in the SPV or its assets. 20' This would fa-
cilitate an ownership interest similar to a tenancy in common, and over
time the SPV or the project sponsors could purchase the financial institu-
tion's interest in the musharaka.203 In this way, the SPV would repay the
funds that the financial institution contributed to the project.204
3. Sukuk: Islamic Asset-Backed Securities 2os
Sukuk are sometimes referred to as Islamic bonds, yet there are sig-
nificant differences between a sukuk and a traditional bond.206 These
Islamic securities may come in two forms: asset-based and asset-
backed.207 First, given the prohibition against riba, a sukuk should be
197. See Holden, supra note 19, at 351.
198. See Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 711.
199. See Rehman, supra note 19, at 631; Holden, supra note 19, at 346-47.
200. See McMillen, supra note 93, at 729.
201. See, e.g., McMillen, supra note 2, at 1234-36 (describing a project that utilized a
partnership structure in which banks took a partnership interest in an entity that owned the
project assets).
202. See DENTON WILDE SAPTE LLP, supra note 64, at 7.
203. Id. at 8 (describing the "diminishing musharaka").
204. See, e.g., McMillen, supra note 2, at 1236.
205. An adequate discussion of Sukuk structures is worthy of a separate article unto
itself.
206. See DENTON WILDE SAPTE LLP, supra note 64, at 19; see also McMillen, supra
note 96, at 427-28 (2007) (discussing two types of sukuk).
207. See DENTON WLDE SAPTE LLP, supra note 64, at 19; see also McMillen, supra
note 96, at 428 ("Securitizations involve asset transfers from an originator into a trust or simi-
lar special purpose vehicle ('SPV') with sukuk issuance by that SPV and payments on the
sukuk derived from the payments received in respect of those transferred assets.") (emphasis
added). The difference between the idea of asset-based and asset-backed sukuk is described as
the following:
A true, asset-backed sukuk should be similar to a conventional securitization with
the investors' only recourse being to the assets. However, in most sukuk to date, the
investors have primarily focused on a purchase undertaking from the originator to
buy back the assets on either a scheduled or early redemption....
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backed by an underlying asset and represent a beneficial interest in that
asset.208 Nonetheless, most sukuk are in fact asset-based, such as when a
government guarantees the borrowed proceeds and uses those proceeds
to purchase assets.2 " Asset-based sukuk resemble traditional bonds in
that a government or a government entity issues them in order to finance
the purchase of an asset or to help finance a project. While the asset un-
derlies the transaction, it is the creditworthiness of the government issuer
that makes these issuances bankable. Thus, asset-based sukuk focus on
the purchasing entity as opposed to the assets purchased.2 10
Another type of sukuk resembles an asset-backed security issued by
an Islamic finance institution, although it is less common.2' Asset-
backed "[s]ecuritizations involve asset transfers from an originator into a
trust or similar [SPV] with sukuk issuance by that SPV and payments on
the sukuk derived from the payments received in respect of those trans-
ferred assets."2 12 This means that the asset-backed sukuk holders actually
hold "a proportional or fractional undivided ownership interest in an as-
set or pool of assets."213 In a sense, the asset-backed sukuk is a form of
partial title in the underlying asset. This form of sukuk includes project
financing that securitizes the project assets without a guarantee of re-
payment from the project's government sponsor, corporate sponsor, or
other equity sponsor.214
This approach has, therefore, meant that most sukuk have been asset based [sic] and
not asset backed [sic]. [Asset-backed] [slukuk should arguably be structured so that
they are in effect the same as a conventional securitization in that the investors (who
own the assets under the sukuk) should only be looking to those assets to obtain
their financial returns and the recovery of their initial investments.
DENTON WILDE SAPTE LLP, supra note 64, at 19. Despite the similarity that an asset-backed
sukuk may bear to the mortgage-backed securities that led to the current economic crisis in
much of the world, it is unlikely that once a sukuk is issued, it would be permissible under
Shari ah to repackage and resell the sukuk in a manner similar to the repackaging of mort-
gages. The reason for this is that under Shari'ah "[p]rofit is generated when something having
intrinsic utility is sold for money . . . ." USMANI, supra note 63, at xv. Thus, it would likely
violate Shari'ah to derive profit from a non-liquid asset lacking in intrinsic utility, such as a
repackaged mortgage-backed security. See id.
208. See Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 719-20; supra note 207; see also DENTON WILDE
SAPTE LLP, supra note 64, at 19 ("The investors should own a pool of assets supporting the
sukuk issue and not just the right to a debt or revenue stream divorced from ownership of the
revenue producing assets.").
209. See Marray, supra note 159, at 24 (discussing a sukuk issuance that "[was] more
similar to covered bonds" because the investor would look to the borrower for repayment of
the loan rather than the financed asset); supra note 207.
210. See USMANI, supra note 63, at xiv-xv; McMillen, supra note 96, at 428; supra note
207.
211. See McMillen, supra note 96, at 428.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See supra note 207.
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As will be discussed below, for the purposes of project finance, su-
kuk issuances are often used to securitize the assets that are obtained
from another type of Islamic financing structure, such as an ijara, a mu-
daraba, or a musharaka.215 Sukuk issuances have the greatest potential to
spur the expansion of Islamic project finance both within and outside of
the Islamic world. For example, a sukuk issuance raised $700 million in
Qatar in 2003, partly for the construction of a medical facility,"' and in
2006, the first sukuk-financed project in the United States helped raise
$165.7 million for the construction and operation of oil and gas assets in
the Gulf of Mexico.217
Some of the tools and financing structures discussed in this Section
have direct application to project finance. Yet, in most cases these Is-
lamic financing mechanisms have been adapted to address the specific
needs of a project. In other cases, project finance has innovated tools
specific to the needs of Islamic project finance, including the transfer to
and retention of title by the project's Islamic lenders. As the field of Is-
lamic project finance continues to grow, further innovation within the
confines of these basic Islamic financing tools is likely.2"8
B. The Application of Islamic Financing Tools to Project Finance
Combinations of the Islamic financing structures are common in or-
der to adapt Islamic finance to the needs of large projects.219 In recent
years, sukuk combinations with other structures have become common
given the ability of a sukuk issuance to raise large amounts of capital
over a numerous and diverse pool of investors.220 Yet, sukuk is not the
only option for project finance. Commissioned manufacturing in combi-
nation with lease agreements during the operational period are common
in the form of a dual istisna 'a-ijara arrangement.' Similarly, use of one
of the partnership arrangements in combination with a murabaha agree-
ment would enlarge the capital pool for the funding of projects on a cost-
plus basis.222 These combinations help address the capital requirements of
215. See McMillen, supra note 96, at 429.
216. See Marray, supra note 159, at 24.
217. See Richardson, supra note 21, at 149-52.
218. There are other Islamic financing tools in existence, some of which could play a
role in project financing, but they are probably not the vehicles for funding and operating the
SPV and the project assets. Such instruments include the wakalah, takaful, damanah, and
urban, which are, respectively, Shari 'ah-compliant agency contracts, insurance policies, third-
party guarantees, and partial advance payments. See Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 715-17.
219. See Traill, supra note 133, at 29.
220. See McMillen, supra note 96, at 430-31.
221. See McMillen, supra note 2, at 1237-39.
222. See id. at 1232-36.
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project finance, while also facilitating retention of title and enabling the
Islamic lenders to comply with Shari'ah.
Under the istisna'a-ijara structure, the istisna'a agreement is actu-
ally the first of the two agreements to take effect, with the ijara going
into effect upon the completion of the construction of the asset.223 If this
structure were to be categorized as debt-like or equity-like, it would be
debt-like since there is no partnership agreement in the transaction, and a
single financier or lending institution takes title to the asset that it subse-
quently leases.224 Under an istisna 'a agreement, the Islamic financier will
commission the construction of the SPV assets. During the construction,
the Islamic financier will typically remain liable for the construction of
the assets, thus bearing the risk of the project.22 Upon completion of the
project, the Islamic financier retains title to the SPV assets, and enters
into an ijara agreement with the SPV whereby the SPV makes periodic
lease payments to the Islamic financier, typically in an amount greater
than the construction cost of the assets.22 6 Upon completion of the lease
term, the SPV can either purchase the assets and take title to them from
the Islamic financier or enter into another ijara agreement at renegoti-
ated payment rates.22 ' This structure is used extensively in commercial
real estate projects, and has even been used to fund such projects in the
United States. 28
One of the partnership agreements, either a musharaka or a muda-
raba, can be used in combination with a murabaha agreement to achieve
a structure very similar to equity financing of the SPV.229 Under this ar-
rangement, Islamic financial institutions would enter into one of the two
partnership agreements with the SPV. If the SPV does not provide any
capital, the structure will be a mudaraba agreement in which the banks
provide the capital and the SPV provides the management experience.
Conversely, if the SPV is to provide some capital, a musharaka would be
the preferred partnership structure. 230 Each of the capital contributors re-
ceives shares (hissas) in the partnership in proportion to its
contribution.23' In this way, the banks fund the SPV, and although the
partnership would probably retain title to the project assets, the banks'
223. See id. at 1239.
224. See Qureshi & Millet, supra note 12, at 5.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 175-179.
226. See McMillen, supra note 2, at 1239. ("The rent will commence immediately upon
execution of the ijara if the [SPV assets have] sufficient economic value and substance at that
time, meaning that it can be, and is, put to the use for which it was intended.").
227. See id.
228. See, e.g., id. at 1237-47; infra Part IV.B.l.
229. See, e.g., McMillen, supra note 2, at 1232-36.
230. See supra Part 1H.A.2.
231. See, e.g., McMillen, supra note 2, at 1234-35.
599Spring 2011]
Michigan Journal of International Law
partnership hissas would represent their interest in those assets. Once the
SPV begins operation, the murabaha portion of the agreement will take
effect. Under the murabaha agreement, the SPV will purchase shares
from the partners at cost plus profit.232 These repurchases can either be
made in accordance with a predetermined purchase schedule, or in a
lump sum purchase after a specified period.233 In this way, the SPV even-
tually repurchases all of the shares and the partnership is dissolved,
leaving the SPV with title to the project assets.24 Arrangements similar
to this have been used in Saudi Arabia to fund a utility power project.235
The final, and perhaps most diverse, set of possibilities for Islamic
project finance involves the use of sukuk issuances to securitize the as-
sets of a project held and operated under any one of the structures
mentioned in Part III.236 As mentioned above, an asset-backed sukuk is-
suance would avail the investors to a form of partial title in the
underlying project assets.3 In 2004 the AAOIFI issued the Standard for
Investment Sukuk that provided for fourteen eligible asset classes, includ-
ing ijara agreements, istisna'a agreements to fund construction,
murabaha agreements to fund the acquisition of assets on a cost-plus
basis, and musharaka or mudaraba agreements to fund participation in a
business or investment activity.23 8 Although the AAOIFI is not an indus-
try-wide body with regulatory authority, this pronouncement does give
an indication of the likely permissibility of the various sukuk struc-
tures.239 It would be an exhaustive process to examine all the possible
permutations of sukuk securitizations of Islamic financing structures.
Nonetheless, it is sufficient to say that the ability of any of these Islamic
financing structures to securitize and transfer partial title to assets creates
a much wider capital base for each such structure.240 The result has been
an increase in project financings in the Islamic world, as well as ex-
panded participation in project financing outside of the Islamic world.24'
These tools at first may seem counterintuitive, but if there is one ta-
keaway, it is that all of these financing structures focus on the necessity
of the Islamic lender to retain some degree of title in the underlying pro-
232. See, e.g., id. at 1236.
233. See, e.g., id.
234. See, e.g., id. at 1233.
235. See, e.g., id. at 1232-36; see infra Part IV.A.2.
236. See McMillen, supra note 96, at 429.
237. See supra Part III.A.3.
238. See McMillen, supra note 96, at 428-29 (citing ACCOUNTING & AUDITING ORG.
FOR ISLAMIC FIN. INST., SHARI'A STANDARDS 296 (2004)).
239. See DENTON WILDE SAPTE LLP, supra note 64, at 19-20 (describing the Account-
ing and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions).
240. See McMillen, supra note 96, at 429-30.
241. See El Qorchi, supra note 13, at 46; Marray, supra note 15, at 33.
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ject asset. In the istisna'a-ifara structure, the financier commissions the
construction of the project asset, takes title to it when it is complete, and
then retains title to it while leasing it back to the SPV. With the partner-
ship-murabaha combination, the partnership likely retains title to the
assets, but the financiers' hissas in the partnership afford them an interest
in the project assets until the partnership dissolves and title shifts to the
SPV. Finally, any of the Islamic financing structures in combination with
an asset-backed sukuk could securitize the project assets and thus allow
the financiers to take partial title to those assets. Thus, at the heart of
these Islamic financing structures is the retention of title in the project
assets. Projects that utilize these structures illustrate the feasibility of
using Islamic project finance for projects that span a diverse set of indus-
tries in both the Islamic world and the United States.
IV. CASE STUDIES
This Section will discuss in more detail five projects that demon-
strate the application of Islamic project finance: three in the Islamic
World and two in the United States. These cases highlight the central
theme of Shari'ah-compliant project finance in that they all show that
the main requirement for Shari'ah compliance is to ensure that the Is-
lamic financiers retain title to the SPV assets.242 The first case will
discuss a project that used the rahn-adl collateral security structure, and
the rest of the cases will demonstrate, in the context of project finance,
the tools of Islamic finance that were discussed in Part III. As these cases
show, Shari ah compliance is complex, but it should not be a deterrent to
undertaking potentially lucrative projects.
A. Projects in the Islamic World
The first three cases will demonstrate some of the principles of Is-
lamic project finance in projects that have taken place in the Islamic
world. Two of the projects demonstrate dual-tranche project financing
with Islamic and Western lenders and illustrate how to address both col-
lateral security issues and issues related to the Islamic lender's need for
some degree of title in the financed assets.243 The third project, although
financed through purely Islamic lenders, demonstrates the mechanics of
a hybrid between partnership and cost-plus financing structures.2 This
structure would also work with a mixed group of Islamic and Western
242. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
243. See infra Parts IV.A.1, IV.A.3.
244. See infra Part IV.A.2.
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investors who wished to form a partnership or as a means to finance an
Islamic tranche in a dual-tranche project. These projects not only show
that the retention of title to the financed assets is a key consideration for
Shari'ah compliance, but also illustrate the adaptability of the Islamic
financing structures to projects in various industries.
1. Saudi Chevron Petrochemical Project:
The Rahn-Adl Collateral Security Structure
The Saudi Chevron petrochemical project was a project in Saudi
Arabia in which the sponsors were a Chevron Corporation affiliate and
the Saudi Industrial Venture Capital Group.245 It was the first limited re-
course project in Saudi Arabia, and thus involved interest-bearing loans
as opposed to a Shari'ah-compliant structure. Nonetheless, because the
project involved the perfection of security interests for a syndicate of
Western and Islamic lenders, it illustrates that the rahn-adl structure
would likely also function to establish a security interest in a dual-
tranche project involving interest-bearing debt and Islamic finance.247
The Western lenders in the syndicate wanted a first prior perfected
security interest to cover all of the SPV assets, yet the local (Saudi) lend-
ers considered that retention of title to the SPV assets was required to
perfect a security interest.2 48 The solution was to deposit the rahn, or
mortgage, with a form of mutually agreed upon trustee known as an
adl.249 This would satisfy the Shari ah requirement to retain title, and
would satisfy the Western lender's desire for a security interest without
having to surrender full title in the assets to the Islamic lenders.250 De-
tailed agreements specified the powers of the adl, such as the inability to
sell or surrender the title to the SPV assets without the consent of both
parties.21 The agreements specifying the powers of the adl essentially
made it the agent of the syndicate of lenders to manage the SPV assets
252
until the loaned funds had been repaid or the project defaulted. The
agreements also specified the term of the adl as a period of years beyond
the term of the debt in order to allow for enforcement in the event of de-
245. See McMillen, supra note 2, at 1203.
246. See id. at 1204 n.27.
247. Further, in lieu of an adequate recording system, some countries may require physi-
cal possession to perfect a security interest, much in a manner similar to rahn-adl. See id. at
1205-06.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 1214-16.
250. See id. at 1211-16.
251. See id. at 1216-17.
252. See id. at 1218.
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fault, but an earlier termination was required if all the obligations of the
SPV to the syndicate of lenders were paid and fully performed.
The rahn-adl collateral security structure in the Saudi Chevron pet-
rochemical project is noteworthy for another reason. It shows the
potential for Islamic finance if Western lenders and Islamic lenders are
willing to compromise. The Islamic lenders were willing to forgo strict
adherence to the requirement to retain title in the SPV assets and instead,
substituted another Shari 'ah-compliant tool that would allow the project
to go forward." Conversely, the Western lenders showed a willingness to
address the needs of their Islamic counterparts through an agreement
allowing for the deposit of title on the mortgaged assets with an agent.255
Compromise and ingenuity in the project structure enabled the project to
go forward.256
2. Utility Power Project in Saudi Arabia:
Mudaraba-Murabaha Financing
A utility power project in Saudi Arabia demonstrates the possibilities
of combining an Islamic "equity-like" structure with a "debt-like" struc-
ture.25" This project also used the rahn-adl collateral security structure to
provide a security interest, but it did so in combination with Islamic fi-
nancing tools. 258 The project included five parties: an engineering,
procurement, and construction contractor; three banks; and the utility
company.2' The three banks and the utility company formed a type of
mudaraba agreement, in which the banks capitalized the mudaraba ini-
tially, and then continued to capitalize it periodically according to
construction completion milestones.2 6 Upon the formation of the muda-
raba, each of the members received shares, or hissas, in the venture.261 A
controversial aspect of this project was that during the capitalization of
the project, "the banks were not entitled to any profits [from the
253. See id. at 1219.
254. See id. at 1260-61.
255. See id. at 1206, 1211, 1260-61.
256. See generally McKean James Evans, Note, The Future of Conflict Between Islamic
and Western Financial Systems: Profit, Principle and Pragmatism, 71 U. PrTT. L. REv. 819
(2010) (arguing that Western and Islamic financial systems will need to compromise in the
areas where the two systems come into conflict).
257. The project actually used a sharikat mahassa structure, which under Saudi Arabian
law is a form of joint venture. Essentially, it is a form of partnership like a musharaka or a
mudaraba. The utility power project discussed here would be a mudaraba since the parties
initially had distinct roles in the partnership: the utility company was the technical manager
and the banks provided capital. See McMillen, supra note 2, at 1235; supra Part Il.A.2.
258. See McMillen, supra note 2, at 1234.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 1235.
261. See id.
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mudaraba], nor were they liable for any of its losses or liabilities."2 2
Shari'ah advisory boards were not in agreement on the permissibility of
this structure.6 The murabaha portion of the structure involved the
banks reselling their hissas to the utility. This was effected through a
five-year repayment schedule for the financing on a cost-plus basis.2 In
this way, the utility repaid the funds the banks committed to the pro-
ject.265
This mudaraba-murabaha structure also highlights the importance
of retaining title so that the Islamic lenders achieve Shari'ah compliance.
To finance the utility project, the banks bought an interest in the muda-
raba, which held title to the project assets. Through the banks' interest in
the mudaraba, the banks had title in the project assets.26 Thus, the finan-
ciers through their share ownership in the mudaraba retained title in the
assets underlying the transaction. 267 The utility later repurchased these
shares pursuant to the murabaha agreement, and eventually repaid the
capital that the banks provided. Title in the project assets then shifted to
the utility.268 The shifting of title facilitated the mudaraba-murabaha fi-
nancing structure.
3. Sohar Aluminum, Oman: Istisna'a-Ijara Financing
The Sohar Aluminum smelter project in Oman closed in December
of 2005, and was the first greenfield aluminum smelter to be built in the
26Middle East in the last twenty-five years. 2 The project sponsors were
Oman Oil Company, Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority, and
Alcan.270 The project funding involved $1.545 billion in debt, $1.2 billion
of which was commercial debt, but $260 million of it was financed
through an Islamic financing tranche. 27' The Islamic tranche used an is-
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 1236.
265. It was also a subject of debate as to whether the utility could repurchase the hissas
before the project was competed and operational, or upon the completion of certain mile-
stones. The same questions were raised regarding the murabaha agreement and whether or not
the parties should wait until completion of the project to enter into a resale agreement. A final
issue that the Shari ah advisory boards debated was whether the hissas should be resold at
their net asset value or at fair market value. See id.
266. See id. at 1235.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 187-195.
268. See McMillen, supra note 2, at 1236; see also supra text accompanying notes 187-
195.
269. Sohar Aluminium: No Clubbing, PROJECT FIN., Feb. 2006, at 27, 27.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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tisna'a-ijara financing structure. Pursuant to the istisna'a agreement,
the Sohar Aluminum Project Company commissioned the construction
of the Islamic-financed assets on behalf of the Islamic lenders.7 When
the assets were complete, they were delivered to the Sohar Aluminum
Project Company, but title to the assets passed to the Islamic lenders.274
Under the istisna'a, the Islamic lenders paid the Sohar Aluminum Pro-
ject Company for procurement of the assets via "phase payments."275
Concurrently upon entering into the istisna'a agreement, the Sohar Alu-
minum Project Company entered into an ijara agreement with the
Islamic lenders for the operational phase of the project.7 Under the ijara
lease agreement, Sohar Aluminum Project Company leased the financed
assets from the Islamic lenders and made lease payments that were
closely equivalent to the principal and interest payments made under the
commercial bank tranche.
The istisna'a-ijara structure again highlights the importance of title
retention for the purposes of Shari'ah compliance. In sum, the Islamic
lenders financed the purchase of some of the project assets for the Sohar
Aluminum Project Company under the istisna'a agreement, and received
title to those assets.278 The Islamic lenders then received payment on this
financing via the ijara agreement and upon completion of the lease term,
would transfer title to the assets back to the Sohar Aluminum Project
279Company. As with other Islamic financing structures, retaining title in
the project assets underlying the transaction facilitated the Shari'ah-
compliant financing structure.
B. Projects in the United States
Islamic finance has proven its ability to finance projects outside of
the Islamic world as well. In the two projects discussed in this Section,
one implemented the istisna'a-ijara structure in commercial real estate
projects in Texas and Maryland,280 and the other helped finance oil and
gas production activities in the Gulf of Mexico for a Texas-based
272. See Craig Nethercott & Nick Collins, Sohar Aluminum Smelter Project Islamic
Finance Facility, PROJEcr FIN. NEWS, Jan. 8, 2008 at 36, available at http:f
www.islamicfinancenews.com/HanbookPDF/36.Sohar.pdf.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 37. Under the ijara the operational phase was the period following delivery of
the Islamic financed assets until the final maturity date under the commercial bank tranche. Id.
277. See id.
278. See id. at 36.
279. See id. at 37.
280. See infra Part IV.B. I.
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company through a sukuk offering."' As these examples will show, Sha-
ri'ah-compliant project financing is obtainable in the United States
through facilitating the retention of title in the project assets for the Is-
lamic lenders. On a broader level, Islamic project financing in the United
States "provide[s] an alternative to traditional borrowing, and allow[s
the] . . . issuer to take advantage of a largely untapped resource: liquidity
in the [Islamic] world."
1. Truman Park & Maconda Park Apartments:
Istisna'a-Ijara Financing
The Maconda Park Project in Austin, Texas, and the Truman Park
Project in Largo, Maryland involved residential housing transactions
financed with an istisna'a-ijara financing structure. They were imple-
mented in June of 2000 and April of 2001, respectively." In these deals,
Islamic investors wished to use a Shari'ah-compliant structure to finance
the construction and purchase of residential housing developments." In
both projects, the Islamic investors formed special purpose project com-
panies (a limited partnership in the Maconda project and a limited
liability company in the Truman project) in order to implement the fi-
nancing arrangements.285 The Islamic investors made equity contributions
to the special purpose project companies in order to purchase the prem-
ises on which the construction would take place.286 The lead bank for the
transactions was Key Bank, who formed separate entities called "own-
ers." The owners would then enter into an istisna'a agreement to
construct the structures on these premises. Following construction, the
owners would enter into an ijara agreement with the Islamic investors
through their special purpose project companies.28
For issues relating to Shari'ah compliance, the owners could only
commission the istisna'a agreement for construction of the buildings if
they had some kind of legal right to the land on which the buildings
would be constructed. For this reason, the Islamic investors, who had
previously purchased the land on which the construction would take
place, leased these sites to the owners.8 The owners then commissioned
281. See infra Part IV.B.2.
282. Abdel-Khaleq & Richardson, supra note 32, at 423.
283. McMillen, supra note 2, at 1237.
284. See id. at 1238-40.
285. See id. at 1242.
286. Id. at 1244-45.
287. Id. at 1242.
288. See DENTON WILDE SATE LLP, supra note 64, at 16 ("Another important issue
which is often overlooked is the Islamic financier can only agree to sell a building to the cus-
tomer if it has some legal right to the land on which the building is to be constructed."); see
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the construction of the residences with an istisna'a agreement.289 Once
the residences were completed, the owners had title to the residences and
were leasing the land upon which they were constructed. 290 At this time
the owners entered into an ijara agreement with the Islamic investors
through their respective special purpose project companies for the resi-
dences themselves, and also entered into a sublease back to the Islamic
investors of the land.29' The ijara lease agreements were the primary fi-
nancing documents by which the Islamic investors repaid the funds that
Key Bank disbursed to undertake the construction of the project.292 The
Islamic investors also entered into call option agreements that would
allow them to purchase the residences from the owners at the end of the
ijara term.293
The Maconda Park Project and the Truman Park Project again high-
light the importance of retaining title in the project assets for the purpose
of Shari'ah-compliance. Key Bank formed "owners" for the purposes of
first commissioning the construction of the residences through an istis-
na'a agreement, and then for the purposes of retaining title and leasing
these residences back to the Islamic investors through an ijara agree-
ment.294 Without the ability of the owners to retain title in the residences
themselves, the istisna'a-ijara structures would not have been possi-
ble.2 95 Moreover, the Islamic investors retained ownership in the premises
on which the residences were constructed, and entered into lease agree-
ments for these premises with the owners to ensure validity of the
296istisna 'a agreement.
In addition to facilitating title retention, the Islamic investors' own-
ership of the land also aided in other aspects of Shari'ah-compliance.
The Islamic investor must share in the risk of the project, and ownership
of the project site meant that under U.S. law the Islamic investors re-
tained responsibility for environmental liability, condition of the sites
themselves, and tax payments.297 This left the Islamic investors exposed
to a necessary amount of risk throughout the project.298 In short, the Ma-
conda Park Project and the Truman Park Project show that
also McMillen, supra note 2, at 1247 (discussing in general terms the use of site leases in the
projects to lease the property owned by the Islamic investors to the owners).
289. See McMillen, supra note 2, at 1243.
290. Id. at 1246.
291. See id. at 1252.
292. Id. at 1249.
293. See id. at 1246.
294. See id. at 1242, 1244-46.
295. See id. at 1237-41.
296. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
297. McMillen, supra note 2, at 1247.
298. Id.
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Shari'ah-compliant project financing in the commercial real estate sector
through an istisna'a-ifara structure is quite feasible in the United States.
2. East Cameron Gas Company: Sukuk Offering
Sukuk offerings are very popular in the Islamic world, especially the
Middle East, but most offerings are of the asset-based variety meaning
that "investors have primarily focused on a purchase undertaking from
the originator to buy back the assets on either a scheduled or early re-
demption.",29 Asset-based sukuk, therefore, depend on the credit of the
issuer.'" In the Islamic world, true asset securitizations have been rare in
part due to the inability to obtain ratings from the major international
rating firms, although some sovereign issuances have been rated based
on the rating of the sovereign credit.o' Yet, in the United States, it is
much easier to obtain a credit rating for the issuer, thus overcoming one
of the major obstacles to sukuk issuances in the Islamic world.
To this effect, the first asset-backed sukuk offering in the United
States occurred in July of 2006. The East Cameron Gas Company, a
Texas-based company, raised $165.7 million through a sukuk offering to
finance capital and operating costs associated with drilling and operating
wells in the Gulf of Mexico.302 To avoid potential issues due to an asso-
ciation with riba, the funds raised were also used to eliminate almost all
of East Cameron's outstanding conventional debt.30' Although a modest-
sized deal for the oil and gas industry, it could be replicated on a much
larger scale, assuming there is sufficient interest on the part of inves-
tors.3 0 Both Muslim and non-Muslim investors subscribed to the
issuance.o Banks in London and Beirut provided the underwriting, with
legal counsel in both Houston and Dubai.
Louisiana law governed the property underlying the sukuk given that
the project was located in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Louisi-
ana.3 07 Nonetheless, oil and gas law in Louisiana, Texas, and other states
in the United States provide a framework that seamlessly accommodates
Shari'ah-compliance. In Louisiana, Texas, and other states, the minerals
in the ground are often a separate and severable estate from the surface
299. DENTON WILDE SAPTE LLP, supra note 64, at 19.
300. See McMillen, supra note 96, at 428; supra notes 63, 208-210 and accompanying
text.
301. See McMillen, supra note 96, at 428.
302. Richardson, supra note 21, at 149; see also Abdel-Khaleq & Richardson, supra
note 32, at 422.
303. Abdel-Khaleq & Richardson, supra note 32, at 423.
304. See Richardson, supra note 21, at 152.
305. Id. at 150.
306. Abdel-Khaleq & Richardson, supra note 32, at 422-23.
307. See id. at 423.
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estate.3 The rights to the minerals in the mineral estate are subject to
joint ownership in numerous forms, but one of the most popular forms is
a royalty interest.30 A royalty is "an economic interest . . . defined as 'a
share of production free of the costs of production, when and if there is
oil and gas production on the property."' 3 0 East Cameron sold a royalty
interest in its federal offshore oil and gas leases to an SPV, which in turn
issued the sukuk as a private placement offering.3 " Subsequently, East
Cameron received the funds from the sukuk to finance the operation ac-
tivities of its production facilities.312 In short, the asset underlying the
sukuk was the royalty interest in the oil and gas that East Cameron would
produce as a result of the transaction,"' and the sukuk themselves repre-
sented a beneficial ownership interest in the royalty.3 14
If East Cameron produced enough oil and gas to generate a profit,
this royalty interest would entitle the SPV to a percentage of the profit,35
which the SPV would then distribute to the sukuk holders.316 The SPV
takes no part in the drilling or production activities. It only holds a
"non-working interest that entitles it to a portion of the stream of income
generated by the sale of production."" Moreover, the sukuk offering was
non-recourse to East Cameron, meaning that if the royalty could not
generate sufficient funds, East Cameron would not be obligated to pay
the sukuk holders.318 Thus, the Islamic investors bore risk associated with
insufficient oil and gas reserves to support the sukuk issuance, a natural
disaster that could impact production, or price risk. 9
The sukuk offering was Shari'ah-compliant due to the risk sharing
on the part of the sukuk holders, and the characterization under Louisi-
ana law of a royalty interest as real property, of which the sukuk holders
held undivided beneficial ownership. 32 0 This undivided beneficial owner-
ship could be considered a form of partial title in the royalty interest.
The financial institutions structuring the transaction retained the services
of two renowned Islamic scholars, one in Bahrain and one in the United
308. See Richardson, supra note 21, at 134-36.
309. See id. at 136-37.
310. Id. at 137 (quoting JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 43 (3d ed.
1995)).
311. See Abdel-Khaleq & Richardson, supra note 32, at 422-23; Richardson, supra note
21, at 149-50.
312. See Richardson, supra note 21, at 149-50.
313. See Abdel-Khaleq & Richardson, supra note 32, at 423.
314. See Richardson, supra note 21, at 150.
315. See id. at 150-51.
316. See Abdel-Khaleq & Richardson, supra note 32, at 423-24.
317. Id. at 423.
318. See id. at 424.
319. See id.
320. See Richardson, supra note 21, at 151.
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States."' These Islamic scholars were consulted throughout the process
of structuring the project, and ultimately issued afatwa approving of the
deal. In the end, Shari'ah compliance again focused on the retention of
title in some of the assets underlying the project.323 Once this was
achieved, the investors shared in the project risks, and received rentals on
the project's production, as opposed to interest payments.
Sukuk offerings are perhaps the most malleable of the Islamic fi-
nancing structures. Any project structure that generates or contributes to
the generation of a revenue stream is subject to securitization for the
purposes of a sukuk offering.5 Although East Cameron was a high-risk
project with a CCC+ credit rating that ultimately defaulted,326 its experi-
ence shows that sukuk offerings are a potential source of funds for
project finance in the United States. Notwithstanding the current eco-
nomic downturn and the effect it has had on securitization, it is clear that
sukuk offerings in the oil and gas industry in the United States hold tre-
mendous long-term potential given the enthusiasm for the East Cameron
deal on the part of both Islamic and non-Islamic investors.32
As was highlighted throughout the discussions of these cases, struc-
turing the project in a manner that allows the Islamic lenders to retain
title to some of the project's assets, or a portion of the project's assets,
will do much to ensure that the project is Shari ah-compliant. The
rahn-adl arrangement can satisfy the dual purpose of allowing for the
retention of title in the project assets with Islamic lenders while also
enabling Western lenders to have a security interest in the financed as-
sets. The mudaraba-murabaha arrangement demonstrates how Islamic
lenders can retain title through shared ownership in a type of partnership
arrangement. Istisna'a-ijara can work on its own or alongside Western
tranches of debt, and allows for the Islamic lender to commission con-
struction, retain title, and lease the assets back to the SPV or the
project's owners. A true asset-backed sukuk is functionally a portion of
the title in the assets under it, and as such, it enables a form of partial
retention of title for the Islamic financiers. These projects show that re-
tention of title on the part of the Islamic financiers is at the heart of
Shari'ah-compliant financing, and is also a workable model alongside
projects with Western financing sources.
321. See Abdel-Khaleq & Richardson, supra note 32, at 424.
322. Richardson, supra note 21, at 151.
323. See, e.g., id. at 150-51.
324. See id. at 151.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 215-217, 236-241.
326. Sukuk it up, EcONOMIST, Apr. 17, 2010, at 82.
327. See Richardson, supra note 21, at 149.
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CONCLUSION
The key to Shari'ah compliance is to facilitate the retention of title
on the part of the Islamic lenders in the project assets underlying the fi-
nancing transaction.32 Once the lender has title to these assets, he is
subject to the risks of the project and any return on the investment will
be in the form of rents on the assets, and not riba.329 Moreover, Shari 'ah-
compliant financing is well-suited for project finance due to the nature of
the projects typically undertaken in project finance transactions. Such
projects tend to be large industrial or infrastructure projects whose cash
flows can be projected to some extent, which avoids the prohibition on
gharar." Finally, as long as the project is not or does not facilitate an
activity that is haram, the project should be Shari'ah-compliant. 331 IS-
lamic project finance conflicts with Western project finance practices in
332
ways that create problem areas and potential issues. Yet, as the case
studies show, these problem areas and issues are surmountable through
the use of the many combinations of structures unique to Islamic fi-
333
nance.
Much of the Islamic world consists of countries where a substantial
portion of the economy has traditionally depended on fossil fuels. As the
prices of these commodities rise, these countries will accumulate cash,
which they will look to invest.3 1 Project finance presents opportunities to
invest this cash in many diverse industries outside of the realm of natural
resource exploitation.335 Moreover, the liquidity in the Islamic world
represents an opportunity for Westerners who undertake project finance
activities.3 This is even more true in light of the recent financial troubles
of many Western governments and financial systems.33 ' Thus, the liquid-
ity of the Islamic world is potentially a very large source of capital for
Western project finance investors and could provide them with
328. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 63-69, 123 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 4, 70-84 and accompanying text; see also supra Part IV (providing
examples of Shari 'ah-compliant projects).
331. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
332. See supra Part II.
333. See supra Part IV.
334. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
335. See supra Part IV.
336. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
337. See Kevin Brown, Special Report, Wider Appeal Battles with Signs of Inefficiency,
FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 8, 2009, at 5.
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investment opportunities they may not otherwise have if their only
sources of financing are Western financial markets."'
For the Islamic world, project finance is an avenue not only for in-
vestment, but also for infrastructure development and economic
diversification.3 Western project finance partners are likely to bring
knowledge and technical expertise to the Islamic world about industries
that may not be fully developed locally. Shari'ah-compliant project fi-
nance has proven its ability to function outside of the Islamic world as
well.'40 Nonetheless, competition for access to the liquidity of the Islamic
world could be fierce, and those project finance investors that show the
most understanding and willingness to work with Shari'ah-compliant
finance practices will possess an advantage in accessing Islamic sources
of capital.
338. See Richardson, supra note 21, at 152 ("With the potential for liquidity in the Mid-
dle East to continue indefinitely as oil prices remain at near-record highs, there should be
significant sources of funds for U.S. projects in the foreseeable future.").
339. Cf Khan, supra note 67, at 13-14.
340. See supra Part IV.B.
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